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Scientific Realism in  
Constitutional Law 
David L. Faigman† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In scholarly circles a debate rages over whether 
scientific research describes true underlying realities of the 
natural world or merely represents constructed accounts of 
observed events.1 Much of this debate involves natural science 
and reaches such fundamental issues as whether, for example, 
we can positively conclude that electrons exist or must be 
limited to statements about the observed effects of electrons, 
since we cannot observe those subatomic particles directly. 
Scientific realists argue that science is not simply a collection 
of hypotheses supported by empirical tests, but actually 
describes an underlying reality that exists outside of human 
observers. The world, according to this view, is “mind 
independent.” The core philosophical disagreement found in 
the natural sciences can also be found in the many other 
disciplines in which knowledge about the empirical world is 
essential, from the social sciences to the humanities, only more 
so. Any mind-dependence infecting physics would impair the 
social sciences and humanities at many times the rate. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the law, as a consumer of these 
empirically conscious disciplines, is deeply affected by these 
debates and, to some extent, must choose sides. In the law, the 
question whether reality is real or not is more than an 
academic debate. The law’s response to this debate has, not to 
put too fine an ironic point on it, substantial real-world 
consequences. 
  
 † John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, 
Hastings College of the Law. 
 1 See generally JAMES ROBERT BROWN, WHO RULES IN SCIENCE: AN 
OPINIONATED GUIDE TO THE WARS (2001); STATHIS PSILLOS, SCIENTIFIC REALISM: HOW 
SCIENCE TRACKS TRUTH (1999); MICHAEL DEVITT, REALISM AND TRUTH (2d ed. 1991). 
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A diversity of views is represented by the label 
“scientific realism.” Among the choices of philosophical starting 
premises, however, realism most centrally embraces the notion 
that science discovers “truth.” Truth, albeit with a lowercase t, 
does not necessarily imply that scientists can say unambigu-
ously or with certainty that the world operates in a particular 
fashion. Rather, the world exists in particular ways, and 
science more or less—or with greater or lesser precision—
endeavors to describe that world. But science is a human 
enterprise and a community effort. The real truth, therefore, 
may be known only rarely and, even then, only after extensive 
study and many missteps. Still, its existence largely makes the 
scientific effort worthwhile. Scientific methods permit the 
development of a body of knowledge about the world that does 
not depend on the cultural backgrounds or values of its 
originators. In common parlance, science can be “objective,” in 
that it can be tested “inter-subjectively” by different people in 
different places having different values.2 Realists believe that 
scientific methods provide an objective lens through which the 
world can be described, if only imprecisely.3 
Challenges to realism come from a wide assortment of 
disciplines, including, among others, philosophy, sociology, and 
literary theory. Critical scholars in these fields4 contest the 
objectivity of knowledge and dispute the claim of mind-
independence that realists believe is possible.5 While there are 
indeed widely ranging views regarding the inscrutable issue of 
the reality of “truth,” necessity requires a simpler presentation 
of the debate in this essay. From the law’s perspective—and, 
more particularly, from the perspective of constitutional 
adjudication—the matter comes down to either believing that 
science can describe the empirical world largely free of bias or 
that it cannot. If facts having relevance to constitutional 
lawmaking do not exist—or cannot be described—separately 
from the values endemic in that lawmaking, then it is 
  
 2 KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 44 (Harper & Row 
1968) (1959) (“[T]he objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be 
inter-subjectively tested.” (emphasis in original)). 
 3 See generally WILLIAM P. ALSTON, A REALIST CONCEPTION OF TRUTH 
(1996). 
 4 See generally BROWN, supra note 1. 
 5 Professor Susan Haack refers to them as the “New Cynics.” She notes that 
they disagree among themselves “on the finer points,” but generally agree that 
“concern for truth, is a kind of illusion, a smokescreen disguising the operations of 
power, politics, and rhetoric.” SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE—WITHIN REASON 
20-21 (2003). 
2008] SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1069 
 
incumbent on courts not to pretend that they do. Facts and 
values (or biases), under this view, may not be one, but they 
are inextricably bound. If this is so, anti-realism is the more 
rational choice to provide the philosophical basis for constitu-
tional adjudication. But if facts can exist independently of 
biasing influences, as I believe they can, then courts should 
fully account for them in their decisions. In short, scientific 
realism obligates courts to take facts seriously.6 
The anti-realist claim that must be rebutted in order to 
substantiate my argument that facts ought to be taken 
seriously in constitutional cases is associated with the belief 
that scientific knowledge is largely socially constructed. 
Adherents of social constructionism fall along a wide spectrum 
of beliefs, with some subscribing to more or less extreme 
versions. Indeed, many realists share the concerns that lie at 
the core of anti-realist critiques of science. Scientific realists 
well appreciate, for example, the effects a researcher’s values 
might have on how hypotheses are formed or what methods are 
selected to test them. Similarly, realists generally accept, at 
least in principle, Thomas Kuhn’s basic claim that theoretical 
paradigms affect the problems scientists study and the answers 
they obtain.7 To a large extent, the difference between sober 
realists and sensible anti-realists is one of degree or emphasis. 
Anti-realists generally hold the view that scientific statements 
are so imbued with the values and social and historical 
contexts of their declarants that they are effectively normative 
in scope. They deny any special claim of “objectivity” to 
scientific facts and, in effect, deny the fact-value distinction 
altogether.  
  
 6 Although the perspective to be defended here is the realist one, as opposed 
to anti-realist and social constructivist alternatives, I need not defend a strong version 
of this perspective. For example, scientific realism is sometimes juxtaposed to 
empiricism. Whereas scientific realists posit the true existence of unobservable 
entities, empiricists are content to be agnostic about underlying realities, though still 
committed to the rationality of hypothesis formation and test. The empiricist tradition 
thus seeks to demonstrate “that theoretical discourse may be so construed that it does 
not commit to the existence of unobservable entities.” PSILLOS, supra note 1, at 3. In 
contrast, the realist tradition “aims to show that a full and just explication of 
theoretical discourse in science requires commitment to the existence of unobservable 
entities.” Id. From the law’s perspective, however, this particular debate is academic, 
since empiricists and realists agree on the virtue of rigorous hypothesis testing. 
Empiricism and realism share the attribute that I refer to as taking facts seriously. 
Compared to strong anti-realist views, therefore, realism and empiricism are close 
cousins. 
 7 See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43-51 
(1970); see also BROWN, supra note 1, at 63-71 (discussing Kuhn and realists’ responses 
to him). 
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Realists, in contrast, believe that the world exists 
independently of the minds of its explorers and that the 
methods of science are largely effective in discovering the 
mechanics of that world. While biases can—and too often do—
infect the explorations of scientists, scientific methods are 
designed and employed to limit that bias as much as possible. 
Hence, when failures occur, as they have and inevitably will, 
they are attributable to the scientists, not science. The solution 
is to strive for better scientific research, not abandon the 
enterprise. 
Although the United States Supreme Court is an 
eminently realist institution in that the justices almost 
certainly see themselves as situated in a mind-independent 
real world, the Court tends to employ facts as though they were 
subjects of social construction. The Court insistently employs 
factual arguments rhetorically, as premises that can be 
manipulated or massaged in the service of one or another legal 
outcome.8 The Court has largely constructed an empirical world 
that serves the normative vision it holds for the Constitution. 
For example, it may be that the Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizure is defined in light of 
an “objective” person’s “reasonable expectations of privacy,”9 
but the justices make no attempt to match the empirical reality 
of such expectations with constitutional outcomes. The Court’s 
subjective construction of those expectations establishes the 
contours of the Fourth Amendment right. The justices, 
therefore, stand in the untenable position of subscribing to 
scientific realism as a foundational philosophy, but act as anti-
realists in crafting constitutional outcomes. To vary an old 
saying, they want to have their cake and make us eat it too. 
In this Essay, I examine whether facts can be treated 
realistically in constitutional decision making. In particular, I 
consider two potentially insurmountable challenges to a 
scientifically realist constitutional jurisprudence. The first is 
the question of whether the sorts of facts the Constitution 
makes relevant—primarily behavioral and societal facts 
studied by social scientists—can be studied relatively 
objectively. The second is whether the constitutional inquiries 
in which facts play a part are hopeless conglomerations, so that 
  
 8 See David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring 
the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 549-
50 (1991). 
 9  See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000). 
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the empirical and the normative cannot be separated. I 
conclude that while both of these issues present formidable 
challenges, neither is fatal to the development of a scientifically 
realist constitutional jurisprudence. 
II. REALIZING A SCIENTIFICALLY REALISTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
It must be emphasized at the outset that believing that 
scientists study true underlying realities says little about the 
value of a particular research program for the law. Although 
some fact may be “true,” this does not mean that particular 
legal consequences flow from that “truth.” The law is an 
applied discipline and so the issue of whether genes truly exist, 
for example, does not answer the question of how, or even 
whether, research indicating some genetic predisposition is 
legally cognizable. In the simplest of terms, “is” does not entail 
“ought.” At its best, science has no particular political agenda. 
For instance, discovering a genetic basis for pedophilia might 
have multiple legal impacts, variously having “liberal” or 
“conservative” consequences. For instance, this genetic 
evidence may be used by defendants to support an insanity 
plea or by prosecutors to establish guilt; both defense lawyers 
and prosecutors may use this proof at sentencing; and the state 
will undoubtedly seek to use this sort of evidence in 
commitment hearings of alleged sexually violent predators. 
Good science is neither inherently liberal nor conservative. 
It is also important to emphasize that applied science is 
invariably variable. What is “true” generally will be true only 
some of the time in practice.10 The “truth” of the empirical 
connection between genes and pedophilia is not the ultimate 
question in most legal disputes. While the general truth is 
certainly pertinent, the operative issue typically will be 
whether some particular person has acted (or will act in the 
  
 10 It is worth noting that even general “truths” in science are provisional, or 
uncertain, in a variety of ways. General findings are only as good as the research 
supporting them and, especially in the behavioral sciences, are usually described 
probabilistically. For example, psychologists have found that cross-racial 
identifications are less reliable than same-race identifications. See Christian A. 
Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in 
Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 4 (2001). 
Although this is a well-researched phenomenon, it is not invariable. See Stephanie J. 
Platz & Harmon M. Hosch, Cross-Racial/Ethnic Eyewitness Identification: A Field 
Study, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 972, 972-73 (1988). In addition, even the best 
believed scientific truths might someday be overturned by new discoveries or more 
inclusive theories. 
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future) in accordance with this genetic predisposition. However 
true the underlying reality, this knowledge will be probabilistic 
in application. As with virtually all applied science, research 
will at best illuminate the statistical relations between factors. 
Moreover, in most cases, the hypothesized empirical connec-
tion, itself probabilistically described, will be clouded by the 
possibility of factors never studied and systematic and random 
error endemic to any research program. Research, for example, 
might indicate that forty-five percent of men with a specific set 
of, say, thirteen genes will be sexual aggressors. This, of course, 
would be highly relevant information. Yet, fifty-five percent of 
men with these genes will not be sexual aggressors. It may be 
that environmental factors or other variables partly explain 
which men will act on their seeming predispositions and which 
will not. Whatever the case, when it comes to individual 
statements of fact, the best that scientists can do is speak in 
terms of probabilities and statistics. 
The probabilistic character of applied science is an 
inherent limitation of the discipline. The tools of science, 
therefore, are limited in their capacity to describe the world 
that the law regulates. Importantly, however, the uncertainty, 
or error, associated with scientific tools is primarily random 
rather than systematic. In other words, the error is randomly 
distributed among political outcomes and does not systematic-
ally prefer the conclusions particular researchers might favor. 
The anti-realist critique is directed at the prospect  
of systematic error. Anti-realists believe that researchers’ 
subjective biases infuse the design and interpretation of their 
work. They do not believe reality exists separately from 
researchers’ statements. The reality is in the words, not  
the world. To many in the law, however, asking whether 
constitutional facts are mind-independent will strike them as 
patently absurd. Indeed, even among anti-realists, the strong 
version of the claim is truly endorsed by only a small group of 
skeptics, and one might wonder how strongly even they believe 
it. Even the most ardent anti-realists look both ways when they 
cross the street. But a somewhat weaker form of anti-realism 
might have a place in constitutional cases. This is so for two 
independent reasons.  
First, many of the facts having constitutional 
significance come from the so-called softer disciplines of psychi-
atry, psychology, economics, political science, and sociology. 
These fields have a history of producing socially dependent 
knowledge and employ methods that limit their power to 
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transcend time, place, and setting. Unlike many of the natural 
sciences, these fields tend to produce results that are weak  
in explanatory power, methodological rigor, and demonstrated 
reproducibility.  
The second reason to believe that a weak form of anti-
realism has a place in constitutional cases is that, in practice, 
the Court tends to amalgamate constitutional facts and 
constitutional norms. For example, in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court held that pre-
viability abortion regulations violate the Constitution if they 
“unduly burden” the right of reproductive choice.11 The Court 
defined as unduly burdensome laws that create a “substantial 
obstacle” to the exercise of the right.12 Whether a law places 
obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise of her right to an 
abortion is an empirical question. Whether these obstacles 
qualify as substantial obstacles—enough to create an undue 
burden—is a question that contains a strong normative 
component. The undue burden standard, therefore, creates a 
constitutional problem that is an admixture of fact and value, 
and thus arguably contemplates a socially constructed answer. 
This section considers the two basic forms of anti-
realism as they might be manifested in constitutional cases. 
Due to space considerations, the following discussion is limited 
to social science, which is the predominant form of science 
found in constitutional cases. Also, if the case is made 
successfully with social science, its more muscular cousins 
should pass philosophical muster easily.13 Part A first considers 
whether the social sciences can achieve some measure of 
objectivity. Part B then considers whether constitutional 
standards, such as the undue burden test of Casey, can be 
untangled so that the factual elements can be examined 
independently of the normative insights that inform them. 
  
 11 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992). 
 12 Id. at 846. 
 13 This essay focuses on science; space constraints preclude my consideration 
of history, the penultimate (and possibly ultimate) source of factual information in 
constitutional cases. In the admittedly misleading hierarchy of objectivity, if the 
methods of natural science allow it to be more objective than social science, the 
methods of social science allow it to be more objective than history. Hence, on balance, 
the anti-realist critique resonates somewhat more with historical “truth” than scientific 
“truth”—though good history is much more than mere social constructions. 
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A.  Soft Science and Social Construction 
Implicit or explicit in virtually all discussions of the 
significance of social science findings to legal decision-making 
lies the question of whether social inquiry can be scientific. 
Perhaps the most often repeated criticism of social science is 
that it is inherently value laden.14 A component of this 
argument is based on the truism that, as human beings, social 
scientists study themselves. Social scientists bring too much 
baggage of their own to the laboratory, the argument goes, to 
be able to study other people’s behavior objectively. Without 
question, social scientists’ values affect the kinds of research 
they do and, at least indirectly, their findings. This is true of 
the natural sciences as well. The topics selected for study, the 
variables identified as worthy of measurement, and, to some 
extent, the interpretation of findings, depend on the values, 
interests, and intentions of the scientist and the times in which 
he or she lives. The principal advantage of scientific methods is 
not that they eliminate researchers’ biases, only that they help 
to control and reveal the biases that do exist. 
Essentially six basic sources of bias in social inquiry can 
be readily identified: (1) the selection of problems, (2) the 
definition of the subject of study, (3) the methodological choices 
made, (4) the determination of the contents of conclusions,  
(5) the division of fact from value, and (6) the assessment of 
evidence.15 Although these six sources of bias constitute 
significant challenges to social scientific inquiry, they do not 
doom the project. 
1.  Selecting Problems 
Social scientists have long been criticized for spending a 
disproportionate amount of time on law-related issues about 
which the law cares relatively little. For example, researchers’ 
efforts to study juries is out of all proportion either to the 
  
 14 See Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in 
Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 127; 
David M. O’Brien, The Seduction of the Judiciary: Social Science and the Courts, 64 
JUDICATURE 8, 12 (1980); see also Harry Willmer Jones, Legal Inquiry and the Methods 
of Science, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ROLE OF SCIENCE 120, 128-29 (Harry Willmer Jones 
ed., 1966). 
 15 This section owes a considerable intellectual debt to Professor Ernst Nagel, 
who posited—and refuted—several of these sources of bias in his extraordinary book 
The Structure of Science. See generally ERNST NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE: 
PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1961). 
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number of trials or to the number of trials involving juries. 
Additionally, a brief perusal of the social science and law 
literature would suggest that eyewitness identification is the 
most important empirical issue facing the legal system.16 
Although social scientists have increasingly expanded their 
research focus to new areas of the law,17 it remains fair to 
complain that they concentrate inordinately on juries, witnes-
ses, and criminals. Behavioral issues in other areas, such as 
constitutional law, torts, and property, are largely ignored. 
Not surprisingly, social scientists tend to select 
problems on the basis of their interests, their understanding of 
the law, and the amenability of the problems to scientific study. 
Thus, the proliferation of studies on eyewitness identification is 
understandable, in that it flows naturally from a long history of 
research on human perception and memory. Also, a non-lawyer 
can easily understand the danger of eyewitness misidentifi-
cation and its importance to the law.18 Thus, unlike complex 
legal and psychological issues, such as the coercive impact of 
religiously inspired prayer at graduation ceremonies,19 eye-
witness perception requires little legal sophistication and is 
relatively easy to research. Moreover, the eyewitness research 
literature has been an influential component of public policy 
debates and has led to a variety of contemporary reforms.20 
Psychologists interested in having an impact on public policy, 
therefore, have naturally focused on a subject as readily 
amenable to study as eyewitness identification. 
Criticism of problem selection in the social sciences 
should be directed more at the possible lack of relevance of the 
research and less at the inherent value bias of the researchers. 
In general, scientists select problems on the basis of what 
seems important, and to this extent all science is culture-
  
 16 See Michael J. Saks, The Law Does Not Live By Eyewitness Testimony 
Alone, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 279, 279 (1986). But see Wallace D. Loh, Psycholegal 
Research: Past and Present, 79 MICH. L. REV. 659, 678 (1981). 
 17 Outside of jury and eyewitness work, promising areas of study include 
children’s memory, predictions of future violence, judgment and decision-making, and 
fMRI brain research. 
 18 See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible 
Eyewitness, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 188, 190 (1975) (“Since eyewitness testimony carries so 
much weight, it is important to find out why distortion occurs in a witness’ memory.”). 
 19 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992) (applying what Justice 
Scalia called the “psychological coercion” test to measure Establishment Clause 
violations, id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 20 See, e.g., TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 3 (Oct. 
1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf. 
1076 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:3 
 
bound. But in the context of science and law, the criticism  
that scientists’ biases influence the hypotheses they test is 
particularly misplaced. In the end, it is the law that dictates 
which hypotheses merit study.  
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, for example, the Court 
considered the question of the constitutionality of an Illinois 
statute providing that “‘[i]n trials for murder it shall be a cause 
for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, state 
that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, 
or that he is opposed to the same.’”21 The challenger argued 
that common sense and the research available indicated that 
excluding jurors who oppose capital punishment (called 
“Witherspoon-excludables”) would result in a jury biased in 
favor of conviction. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, 
agreed that this empirical question was constitutionally 
relevant and deplored the lack of data to answer it: 
The data adduced by the petitioner . . . are too tentative and 
fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death 
penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt. 
We simply cannot conclude, either on the basis of the record now 
before us or as a matter of judicial notice, that the exclusion of jurors 
opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury 
on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk of 
conviction.22 
The Witherspoon Court, therefore, left open the question 
whether research might yet demonstrate that excluding those 
opposed to capital punishment from the guilt-phase of capital 
trials might produce panels that have a propensity for finding 
defendants guilty: “[A] defendant convicted by such a jury in 
some future case might still attempt to establish that the jury 
was less than neutral with respect to guilt.”23 
  
 21 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 512 (1968) (quoting 38 ILL. REV. 
STAT. § 743 (1959) (current version at 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-4(d) (West 
2007)). A juror can be excused for cause only if he or she opposes the death penalty and 
would be unable to set aside those scruples and follow applicable law. Wainwright v. 
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985). The determination whether a particular juror is 
excludable is within the discretion of the trial court and is owed deference on appeal. 
Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2007). 
 22 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517-18. 
 23 Id. at 520 n.18 (emphasis in original). The Court continued as follows: “If 
he were to succeed in that effort, the question would then arise whether the State’s 
interest in submitting the penalty issue to a jury capable of imposing capital 
punishment may be vindicated at the expense of the defendant’s interest in a 
completely fair determination of guilt or innocence . . . .” Id. 
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The social science community’s response to the Court’s 
entreaty was extraordinary.24 Social scientists conducted more 
than a dozen reported studies on the effects of excluding jurors 
opposed to capital punishment.25 The near-consensus of the 
investigators and reviewers of this research corroborated the 
intuitive judgment of the petitioner in Witherspoon that 
excluding death-qualified jurors would result in conviction 
prone juries.26 The courts, therefore, have the power to 
influence the social science agenda. There is no question that 
an explicit, or even a veiled, call for data will cause social 
scientists to come to the Court’s assistance. 
Whether such assistance will be heeded, or heeded well, 
is something that, history suggests, is questionable at best. 
Social scientists’ Witherspoon experience well illustrates the 
dangers associated with taking seriously the Court’s 
expressions of interest in data. In Lockhart v. McCree, the 
Court rejected both the validity and the relevance of the many 
studies done in response to the Witherspoon Court’s call for 
research.27 On the one hand, Chief Justice (then Justice) 
Rehnquist repudiated the validity of the fifteen studies McCree 
had introduced because of “several serious flaws”28 Rehnquist 
found in the research.29 On the other hand, Rehnquist stated 
that even assuming the validity of this research, “the 
Constitution does not prohibit the States from ‘death 
qualifying’ juries in capital cases.”30 In effect, Rehnquist’s 
  
 24 See Michael Finch & Mark Ferraro, The Empirical Challenge to Death-
Qualified Juries: On Further Examination, 65 NEB. L. REV. 21, 24 (1986) (“In the 
seventeen years following Witherspoon, death qualification has been one of the most 
studied subjects in the area of sociological jurisprudence.”). See generally William C. 
Thompson, Death Qualification After Wainwright v. Witt and Lockhart v. McCree, 13 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1989) (analyzing the Court’s treatment of social science in 
constitutional litigation concerning death qualification and discussing the future role of 
such research). 
 25 Finch & Ferraro, supra note 24, at 24-25. 
 26 Finch and Ferraro reported that the data supported three hypotheses: 
(1) jurors excluded because of their inability to impose the death penalty are 
more attitudinally disposed to favor the accused than are non-excluded 
jurors; (2) excluded jurors are more likely to be black or female than non-
excluded jurors; and (3) excluded jurors are more likely to actually acquit the 
accused than are non-excluded jurors. 
Id. at 25. 
 27 476 U.S. 162, 168-69, 171-72 (1986). 
 28 Id. at 168-69. 
 29 For an in-depth discussion of these “flaws,” see Faigman, supra note 8, at 
590-92. 
 30 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173. 
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Lockhart decision repudiated Stevens’s legal analysis in 
Witherspoon, and found that the research was irrelevant to the 
applicable constitutional provisions—the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments—that applied in the case.31 
Although it is true that studying a phenomenon gives it 
status,32 lawmakers remain the ultimate arbiters of a 
phenomenon’s importance. In most cases, researchers take 
their cue from the agenda set by lawmakers. Even when social 
scientists are ahead of the law in identifying and studying 
factors of possible importance, lawmakers must independently 
assess the legal relevance of the factors identified. Certainly, 
policymakers should never defer to social scientists’ ordering of 
phenomena, just as they must guard against singling out for 
reliance certain factors simply because these factors have been 
the subject of scientific testing. As long as lawmakers are 
deciding the areas of importance, however, they have no 
ground to criticize the researchers’ fidelity. 
2. Defining the Subject of Study 
Underlying the realist perspective is the key 
methodological tool of replication. If cold fusion exists, for 
example, it should be demonstrable whether the researchers 
are in Provo, Palo Alto, or Princeton. The first lesson of 
scientific publication is that enough detail must be provided so 
that a reader could replicate the study. This requirement 
serves two essential functions. First, it permits what Karl 
Popper called inter-subjective testability.33 If the research 
findings have merit, other researchers in other settings should 
be able to obtain substantially the same results. Second, and of 
special concern to the law, this requirement informs readers 
regarding how the researchers concretely defined the object of 
their study. An essential step in science, therefore, is to make 
amorphous concepts concrete for the purpose of study by 
defining them operationally.34 
The need to operationally define terms is pervasive in 
science, whether it is physics or psychology. Consider concepts 
such as persistent vegetative state, intelligence, deterrence, 
  
 31 See Faigman, supra note 8, at 594-95 (discussing the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment standards set forth in Lockhart). 
 32 See Fineman & Opie, supra note 14, at 125 n.50. 
 33 POPPER, supra note 2, at 44. 
 34 See PSILLOS, supra note 1, at 5. 
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bio-diversity, competence, violence, prurient interest, viability, 
involuntary euthanasia, reasonable expectations of privacy, 
and so forth. These terms are not self-defining. Scientists must 
somehow make concrete, for purposes of measurement, the 
vague and indefinite concepts of the law. Notions of justice, 
fairness, and equality are hardly self-defining. They must be 
operationally defined. Herbert Feigl nicely explained the 
matter as follows: 
To put it briefly, if crudely, operational analysis is to enable us to 
decide whether a given term in the way it is used, has a “cash value,” 
i.e., factual reference. If it does have factual reference, operational 
analysis is to show us precisely what that factual reference is, in 
terms, ultimately, of the data of direct observation.35 
The issue of defining abstract concepts operationally is 
not unique to social science. Moreover, usually there is some 
choice involved in how something should be operationalized, 
and a researcher should be obligated to explain why he or she 
made one decision rather than another. Consider the simple 
example of temperature. Temperature cannot be directly 
observed, but might be operationally defined as “the linear 
expansion of a mercury column in a glass tube of even width.”36 
But this time-honored mode is not the only way to measure 
how hot or cold it is outside. For example, meteorologists might 
measure temperature by “windchill.” Windchill combines 
thermometer readings with wind speed and takes into account 
physiological factors, such as heat loss from the body (i.e., 
modern heat transfer theory).37 
An indispensable part of evaluating any scientific 
research program ostensibly relevant to a legal matter, 
therefore, requires that lawyers ensure that the researchers 
studied the phenomenon that the law is interested in having 
studied. Consider, for example, the issue of children’s 
competency to make complex decisions, an issue that arises in 
a multitude of constitutional contexts.38 How can we be sure 
that the “competence” the courts speak about is the same 
  
 35 Herbert Feigl, Operationism and Scientific Method, 52 PSYCHOL. REV. 250, 
252-53 (1945) (emphasis in original). 
 36 Id. at 254. 
 37 For an excellent discussion of wind chill, including conversion charts, see 
Nat’l Weather Serv., Windchill: Frequently Asked Questions, Terms and Definitions, 
http://www.weather.gov/om/windchill/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 12, 2007). 
 38 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (requiring competency to 
be executed); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (requiring competency to consent to 
hospitalization in a mental facility). 
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“competence” the social scientists measured in their research? 
The short answer to this question is that we cannot be sure; 
but a court can compare what the social scientists did with its 
own conception of competence. For example, in evaluating 
juveniles’ “competency” to waive their Miranda rights, 
Professor Thomas Grisso identified primarily three components 
of competency reflected in the legal literature: (1) comprehen-
sion of rights, (2) beliefs about legal context, and (3) problem 
solving style.39 Since Professor Grisso’s tests of competency are 
based on courts’ explanations of the concept, courts might be 
expected to find his results to be of some assistance to their 
original inquiry. The important point is that such a comparison 
can be made. Whether the psychological measure of compe-
tence adequately meets the legal conception of competence, 
therefore, can be evaluated by lawmakers who want to rely on 
the science. Hence, the law must, initially, identify the concept 
of interest and, in the end, decide whether scientists who have 
studied the concept of interest have done so adequately. 
3.  Methodological Choices Made 
Science does not exist as a separate repository into 
which all well-founded knowledge is poured. Science is a 
dynamic enterprise that spans subject areas ranging from the 
lowly microbe to the grand universe. The scientific method, 
therefore, is not one method. It is an orientation or approach to 
empirical exploration.40 Different subjects demand different 
modes of analysis. Both electrons and electricians can be topics 
of scientific inquiry, but the particle physicists and industrial-
organizational psychologists who study these respective 
subjects necessarily use very different techniques. But within 
areas of study, not all methods are equal, and they are not all 
employed equally well. Some methods provide brilliant probes 
into the operation of phenomena and others offer little more 
than dim glimpses of fleeting truths. Science, across the 
disciplinary landscape, from acoustics to zoology, is marked by 
  
 39 Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Waiver of Rights: Legal and Psychological 
Competence, in 3 PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 41-58 (Bruce Dennis Sales 
ed., 1981); see also Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children 
and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1594-95 
(1982) (evaluating competency on four scales: evidence of choice, reasonable outcome, 
rational reasons, and understanding). 
 40 See HAACK, supra note 5, at 10 (“There is no distinctive, timeless ‘scientific 
method,’ only the modes of inference and procedures common to all serious inquiry.”). 
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methodological variability. An approach that is appropriate, or 
even possible, for a problem in celestial mechanics may be 
entirely inapplicable for a problem in cellular biology. Indeed, 
very often in science, a single paradigm will not be sufficient to 
study any particular phenomenon. New drugs are tested first 
in laboratory animals and second on humans, and both 
methods are tools of science. 
Since scientific knowledge—or “the truth”—is only as 
good as the methods that researchers bring to bear to discover 
it, it behooves judges and lawyers to have some sophistication 
about those methods.41 The law, of course, relies on a wide 
assortment of scientific expertise, so it might be unrealistic to 
expect that judges will be able to develop proficiency in all of 
them. For example, the American Psychological Association’s 
amicus brief in the juvenile death penalty case of Roper v. 
Simmons advanced data from behavioral studies conducted by 
psychologists and brain-imaging studies done by neuro-
scientists.42 How can judges be expected to be critical 
consumers of such disparate forms of science? 
The short answer is that they have no choice. The real 
question is not whether they can do it, but how they should go 
about doing it. The science exists and judicial decisions that 
ignore the empirical implications of the decision still have real-
world consequences. A judge’s ignorance of causes might make 
him or her ignorant of the consequences of a particular 
decision, but the consequences still occur. Hence, for example, 
if research indicates a high false positive rate for predictions of 
violence in the civil commitment of sexually violent predators, 
ignoring this research, as the Court has done,43 does not alter 
the fact that many people are wrongly deprived of their liberty. 
Although the task for judges appears daunting, it is not 
as difficult as it might first appear. First of all, most of the 
research that is introduced in constitutional cases is not rocket 
science. An elementary understanding of basic statistics and 
research methods will suffice in many cases to reveal the 
benefits and limitations associated with much of the research 
  
 41 See generally David L. Faigman, Judges as “Amateur Scientists,” 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 1207 (2006). 
 42 Brief of American Psychological Ass’n, and the Missouri Psychological 
Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4-12, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 
03-633), 2004 WL 1636447. 
 43 David L. Faigman, Making Moral Judgments Through Behavioural 
Science: The “Substantial Lack of Volitional Control” Requirement in Civil 
Commitments, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 309 (2003). 
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courts must consider. Second, especially in high profile 
constitutional cases, the Court will have considerable help in 
understanding the state of the art of the science. The Court 
suffers no shortage of amici when it comes to answering 
empirical questions about issues such as the onset of viability,44 
whether a health exception is necessary to a ban on partial 
birth abortions,45 the developmental capacities of juveniles,46 
the effects of physician-assisted suicide,47 the effects of virtual 
child pornography,48 and similar factual questions. Finally, 
although the Court is reluctant to employ this aid, all courts 
have the inherent authority to appoint experts to assist them 
with complex technical subjects.49 
4. Determining the Contents of Conclusions 
A pervasive and troubling concern present in all 
scientific research, but particularly in the social sphere, is the 
danger that researchers will graft their values onto their 
conclusions.50 It may be assumed that, in many cases, what 
initially attracts researchers to legal problems is the hope to 
reform legal rules they view as “substantively” wrong. In 
researching the factual context of a legal rule with which social 
scientists disagree, they may unwittingly (or wittingly) 
interpret their data as more supportive of a particular 
normative position than the data actually compel. Although 
natural scientists share this source of difficulty, they do so to a 
lesser degree because a natural scientist’s inquiry tends to be 
less inherently value-laden.51 Although it may be impossible to 
completely eradicate a researcher’s hopes and fears from 
coloring his or her conclusions, these prejudices are not fatal to 
  
 44 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 45 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
 46 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 47 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see also infra notes 88-
104 and accompanying text. 
 48 See Aschcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002). 
 49 See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 
200-YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE LAW 360 (2004) (reporting 
interviews with Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Breyer, who commented on “how 
unusual” the Court’s appointment of a technical adviser would be). 
 50 NAGEL, supra note 15, at 488-89; see also John Passmore, Can the Social 
Sciences Be Value-Free?, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 674 (H. Feigl & 
M. Brodbeck eds., 1953). 
 51 All scientists, whether natural or social, whose work potentially impacts 
public policy formation confront this issue. See, e.g., Jocelyn Kaiser, Taking a Stand: 
Ecologists on a Mission to Save the World, 287 SCIENCE 1188 (2000). 
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scientific social inquiry. At the science and law intersection, 
lawyers and social scientists share the burden of identifying 
and reducing the bias from research findings.  
For their part, researchers must be forthcoming, 
possibly by stating explicitly their substantive biases entirely 
separately from their scientific findings.52 Of course, such a 
practice will never be totally effective because many value 
preferences are not fully known to the scientist, or their effect 
on the analysis is not fully understood.53 Nonetheless, a greater 
recognition of the problem will likely mitigate its effect. 
Additionally, social scientists should display more modesty 
when evaluating the significance of their findings. Sometimes 
researchers exude the confidence in their conclusions that  
their one study has settled the matter for the law. Rarely, if 
ever, is one study so conclusive that a legal rule can rest solely 
upon it.54 
Lawyers must also take responsibility for identifying 
bias where it occurs in empirical research. This means that 
lawyers must understand more than the conclusions advanced; 
they must also consider how the findings were obtained. For 
this purpose, the most important section for lawyers to read 
and understand in a scientific paper is the methods section. 
There, the researcher explains the design of the study, 
describes the sample population, defines—concretely (that is, 
operationally)—the question addressed, and describes the 
statistics used to measure subjects’ responses. The worth, or 
worthlessness, of a study can almost always be discerned from 
the methods section. Only if one understands how the study 
was conducted can one evaluate the soundness of the 
researcher’s conclusions. 
The ability of readers of the scientific literature to iden-
tify errors due to extraneous factors should not be overstated, 
because some errant variables will not be observable in the 
methods, or any other, section. A multitude of unanticipated 
factors could influence the findings of a particular study or 
series of studies. But in the long-term, the ordinary checks 
inherent in the scientific enterprise can be relied upon to 
expose the biases, unconscious or conscious, of the researchers. 
  
 52 NAGEL, supra note 15, at 489. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Michael J. Mahoney, Experimental Methods and Outcome Evaluation, 
46 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 660, 660 (1978) (“The perfect experiment has 
yet to be designed and is, in some sense, inconceivable.” (citation omitted)). 
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Professor Nagel explained the dynamics of this system as 
follows: 
[M]odern science encourages the invention, the mutual exchange, 
and the free but responsible criticisms of ideas; it welcomes 
competition in the quest for knowledge between independent 
investigators, even when their intellectual orientations are different; 
and it progressively diminishes the effects of bias by retaining only 
those proposed conclusions of its inquiries that survive critical 
examination by an indefinitely large community of students, 
whatever be their value preferences or doctrinal commitments.55 
The conclusion that value biases influence the lessons 
researchers draw from their data is less surprising than the 
suggestion that lawmakers can be so easily misled by that bias. 
The methods and conclusions of social science research are like 
the premises and conclusions of legal argument: the validity of 
the premises must be determined in order to assess the 
soundness of the conclusions that the premises purportedly 
compel. Just as no good lawyer would accept a legal conclusion 
without examining the validity of the premises, no good 
lawmaker should accept research findings without examining 
how they were obtained. 
5. Dividing Fact from Value 
A fundamental criticism of scientific social inquiry 
concerns the assertion that fact and value are distinguishable 
in social inquiry. Critics argue that in studying purposive 
human behavior, value judgments invariably become inter-
twined with the descriptions of that behavior.56 Specifically, in 
the ordinary course of describing and categorizing events, 
social scientists cannot help but make evaluative judgments. 
The alternative of describing discrete factual events would be 
cumbersome, simplistic, and probably misleading. An arguable 
instance of this criticism is the psychological study of children’s 
competence, an issue discussed above. It might be argued that 
an unavoidable consequence of studying competence is the 
  
 55 NAGEL, supra note 15, at 489-90; see generally DAVID L. HULL, SCIENCE AS 
A PROCESS: AN EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNT OF THE SOCIAL AND CONCEPTUAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE (1988). 
 56 See Fineman & Opie, supra note 14, at 130 (“The data can never be totally 
separated from the political, personal, and professional opinions of the person 
manipulating them.”); William C. Whitford, Critical Empiricism, 14 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 61, 62 (1989) (asserting the impossibility of fully separating description from 
evaluation); see also Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudence or “Juriscience”?, 25 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 525, 529 (1984). 
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inevitable value judgment required by that categorization. This 
criticism, however, misconstrues the evaluative role of social 
scientific inquiry. 
Without denying that many researchers blur factual 
judgments and value judgments in the course of scientific 
inquiry, in principle these judgments can be kept distinct. 
Professor Nagel noted that confusion often arises from the 
failure to distinguish between “characterizing value judg-
ments” and “appraising value judgments.”57 He provided the 
following example of a characterizing value judgment from 
biology: 
Animals with blood streams sometimes exhibit the condition known 
as “anemia.” An anemic animal has a reduced number of red blood 
corpuscles, so that, among other things, it is less able to maintain a 
constant internal temperature than are members of its species with 
a “normal” supply of such blood cells. However, although the 
meaning of the term “anemia” can be made quite clear, it is not in 
fact defined with complete precision. . . . [T]o decide whether a given 
animal is anemic, an investigator must judge whether the available 
evidence warrants the conclusion that the specimen is anemic. . . . 
When the investigator reaches a conclusion, he can therefore be said 
to be making a “value judgment,” in the sense that he has in mind 
some standardized type of physiological condition designated as 
“anemia” and he assesses what he knows about his specimen with 
the measure provided by this assumed standard.58 
In addition to the assessment that the animal is anemic, 
a biologist might assert that this condition is undesirable 
because of the animal’s inability to maintain itself. Professor 
Nagel referred to such expressions of approval or disapproval 
as “appraising value judgments.”59 To be sure, at times the 
terminology of social inquiry make fact/value distinctions 
difficult, with characterizing value judgments often implying 
appraising value judgments. But this point counsels caution. It 
does not contravene the capacity of social scientists to make the 
distinction. 
By distinguishing characterizing value judgments from 
appraising value judgments, one can understand the factual 
nature of social scientific inquiry into children’s competence. 
For example, psychologists interested in children’s competence 
have gleaned certain characteristics from case law associated 
  
 57 NAGEL, supra note 15, at 493.  
 58 Id. at 492-93 (emphasis in original). 
 59 Id. at 493. 
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with various areas of legal competence.60 In studying this 
question, researchers typically compare children of different 
ages to adults (who are presumed competent by the law) on 
these factors.61 Subsequent characterizations of certain children 
as competent is analogous to the biologist’s characterizations 
concerning anemia in animals. The researcher classifies the 
subject group either within or outside the category of 
competence based on the identified characterizing criteria. 
Whether the psychological measure of competence adequately 
meets the legal conception of competence, therefore, remains 
challengeable separately in the same way that the factors 
characterizing anemia may be challenged. But in no respect 
does the characterizing value judgment that children of a 
certain age are “competent” entail a corresponding appraising 
value judgment. 
In fact, psychological studies that find children as young 
as fifteen comparable to adults in their competency to make 
important decisions may be cited to support widely divergent 
legal conclusions. Whereas this research may support 
children’s participation in decisions of commitment to mental 
hospitals62 and autonomous abortion decisions,63 it may also 
support juveniles’ waivers of Miranda rights.64 Indeed, 
children’s competencies was a hotly disputed issue in Roper v. 
Simmons, in which Justice Kennedy cited social science 
research in support of exempting minors from capital 
punishment, while Justice Scalia, dissenting, decried the 
disingenuity of social scientists who proclaimed minors’ 
capacities in abortion cases but disavowed those capacities in 
capital cases.65 Although the cognitive ability of children is a 
  
 60 See, e.g., GRISSO, supra note 39, at 41-58. 
 61 See, e.g., id. at 95-97; Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 39, at 1591. 
 62 See Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 39, at 1596. 
 63 See Gary B. Melton & Anita J. Pliner, Adolescent Abortion: A Psychological 
Analysis, in ADOLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 5 (G. Melton 
ed. 1986). 
 64 GRISSO, supra note 39, at 194 (noting research finding that juveniles 
between the ages of 15 and 16 with I.Q. scores above 80 “demonstrate[] a level of 
understanding and perception similar to that of 17- to 21-year-old adults for whom the 
competence to waive rights is presumed in law.”).  
 65 Compare Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (“Three general 
differences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders 
cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.”) with Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616-17 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he American 
Psychological Association (APA), which claims in this case that scientific evidence 
shows persons under 18 lack the ability to take moral responsibility for their decisions, 
has previously taken precisely the opposite position before this very Court.”). See 
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scientific question, the legal consequences that befall 
competent and incompetent children remain policy choices. 
Psychologists and economists may be able to identify some of 
the consequences of choosing one course over another, but they 
can never offer scientific judgments on what effects are better 
avoided. Therefore, a court may continue to hold that fifteen-
year-old children should not be consulted when committed to 
mental hospitals, even though they generally may be as 
competent to make important decisions as adults. This result 
can be justified by a concern for family autonomy66 or a 
recognition of competing parental rights.67 When confronted by 
conflicting value choices, courts must exercise their best 
judgment in light of all of the information available. Where 
relevant and valid, social science research can help clarify the 
available choices. 
6. Assessing the Evidence 
In addition to accusations that a researcher’s values 
affect her conclusions, critics claim that bias may enter into the 
very assessment of data.68 There are at least three distinct 
variants of this claim: First, a researcher’s social position and 
educational training influence the kinds of evidence deemed 
important. Second, the statistical decision rules employed by 
researchers mask important value choices.69 And third, a 
researcher’s relative “social perspective” impedes attempts to 
identify “universal” principles.70 
Whether a researcher’s social status affects the kinds of 
evidence he or she deems relevant to social inquiry is an 
empirical question.71 Some support may be expected for the 
assertion that a researcher’s socioeconomic, religious, and 
political views play some part in the assessment of data. But, 
as the previous discussion indicates, manifestations of such 
bias are recognizable by careful review of the measures applied 
  
generally Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death 
Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229 (1989).  
 66 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 598-604 (1979). 
 67 See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 73 (1976). 
 68 See NAGEL, supra note 15, at 495. 
 69 See generally Rudner, The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments, 
in INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 492 (E.D. Klemke et al. 
eds., 3d ed. 1998). 
 70 NAGEL, supra note 15, at 498-99. 
 71 Id. at 495-96. 
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in the research. Once prejudice is identified, a study’s findings 
may be discounted or dismissed accordingly. 
A more technical objection to the problem of assessing 
evidence concerns the statistical rules that researchers use to 
decide if any effect has occurred. When comparing sample 
populations in order to determine whether some variable had 
an effect, two types of error are possible. A researcher may 
conclude that the factor of interest did have an effect when it 
did not (type I error, or “false positive”); or the researcher may 
conclude that the factor of interest had no effect when it did 
(type II error, or “false negative”). Social scientists are well 
acquainted with these sources of error and have devised 
various strategies to avoid them. The present criticism, 
however, is directed not at the possibility of error, but instead 
at the values employed when deciding to avoid one error at the 
expense of possibly committing the other. 
Consider, for example, a group of hypothetical 
researchers who are interested in whether the death penalty is 
a deterrent. Hypothesizing that capital punishment lowers 
murder rates, they might compare states with capital 
punishment to a comparison group of states that do not. Upon 
comparison, the researchers find different murder rates 
between the two groups, but must decide whether they are 
“significant” enough to conclude that the death penalty made 
the difference; after all, some differences should be expected as 
a matter of chance. In assessing the data, the researchers must 
be cognizant of the possibility of committing one of the two 
types of error mentioned above. If they make a type I error, 
they will erroneously conclude that the death penalty had a 
deterrent effect when it did not. Alternatively, they might 
make a type II error, erroneously concluding that the death 
penalty had no deterrent effect when it did. Unfortunately, the 
researchers cannot eliminate or fully minimize the chance of 
making both types of error at the same time, and therefore 
must decide which error is more important to avoid. It appears, 
therefore, that researchers cannot avoid importing their values 
into the assessment of data. 
Although this example illustrates a valid source of 
concern, the magnitude of the problem is not as great as it 
might first appear. Within the social sciences, certain conven-
tions have arisen that minimize an experimenter’s independent 
judgment regarding drawing statistical conclusions from data. 
In particular, the much discussed convention of a .05 confi-
dence level restricts researchers to the relatively conservative 
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risk of a five percent chance of making a type I error. 
Specifically, in the example above, this means that the 
researchers will mistakenly conclude that the death penalty 
has a deterrent effect five or fewer times out of a hundred if the 
death penalty is not a deterrent.72 On some occasions, 
researchers might wish to lessen the risk of making a type I 
error by adopting a more conservative level of confidence, say 
one out of one hundred (.01). Similarly, less concern with 
making a type I error may lead a researcher to adopt a less 
conservative level of confidence, possibly ten out of one 
hundred (.10). Without question, scientists’ value preferences 
can affect the setting of confidence levels in a way that makes 
drawing a particular conclusion more or less difficult. Ideally, 
these judgments should be the responsibility of lawmakers. In 
any case, the standard selected should always be made explicit 
so that readers understand the decision rule the scientist 
applied in stating the conclusion. Departures from .05, and 
indeed even the decision to use a value of .05, should be 
scrutinized independently by anyone relying on a researcher’s 
findings. Once again, the important lesson is that a review of a 
researcher’s methodological discretion illuminates biases 
potentially affecting the reported findings. 
The third and most “radical” claim that values influence 
the assessment of data maintains that a “necessary logical 
connection” exists between the researcher’s social perspective 
and the method and understanding of what is studied, 
rendering lessons from one time or place of no relevance to 
another time or place. Knowledge of societal or cultural facts, 
according to this view, is context specific. Therefore, the factual 
validity of a social finding can only be understood by knowing 
the society from which it emerged. As Professor Nagel 
explained the criticism, “there is no analysis of social 
phenomena which is not the expression of some special social 
standpoint, or which does not reflect the interests and values 
dominant in some sector of the human scene at a certain stage 
of its history.”73 
Although the claim typically excludes the natural 
sciences from its critical gaze, natural scientists also must 
state conclusions in a manner dependent on context. For 
instance, simply measuring the velocity of a stone dropped 
  
 72 Put succinctly, the p-value is the probability of incorrectly rejecting the 
null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true. 
 73 NAGEL, supra note 15, at 498. 
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from a fixed point requires specification of the system of 
measurement used as well as a statement of the experimental 
conditions under which the measurement is taken. The 
situational dependence of this example is complicated further 
by adding the perspective of the observer. Albert Einstein 
provided the paradigmatic illustration of this complication: 
I stand at the window of a railway carriage which is traveling 
uniformly, and drop a stone on the embankment, without throwing 
it. Then, disregarding the influence of the air resistance, I see the 
stone descend in a straight line. A pedestrian who observes the 
misdeed from the footpath notices that the stone falls to earth in a 
parabolic curve. I now ask: Do the “positions” traversed by the stone 
lie “in reality” on a straight line or on a parabola?74 
Absolute objectivity, it would seem, is unattainable even 
in natural science. There is thus no “God’s-eye-view” of the 
world that is discoverable by science, at least not without 
specifying the mountaintop on which He stands. Yet, 
substantial objectivity, or what Professor Nagel refers to as 
“relational objectivity,” is achieved when natural scientists 
identify invariant connections between factors. As a matter of 
logic, natural science can, and often does, identify relations 
which are demonstrable within the specifications established 
by experiment and which transcend particular value 
orientations or social perspectives. 
The social sciences also operate in relationally specific 
contexts. To the extent that objectivity in the natural sciences 
depends on identifying and then transcending specific 
relational contexts, the social sciences, in principle, can do the 
same. Even though two sets of experimental results may be the 
product of separate social perspectives or value orientations, 
additional research may seek out “common denominators”  
from which results may be formulated, irrespective of the 
researcher’s initial perspectives.75 The complaint that the new 
synthesis suffers from a similar perspective-myopia can be 
admitted, though it is hardly the fatal flaw social science’s 
critics suppose. The goal for social science, as well as natural 
science, is relative objectivity, not absolute objectivity. 
A researcher’s values and social perspective inevitably 
intrude into the identification of problems, the analysis of data, 
  
 74 ALBERT EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY; THE SPECIAL AND THE GENERAL THEORY 9 
(Robert W. Lawson trans., Holt 1920). 
 75 NAGEL, supra note 15, at 501. 
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and the conclusions drawn from the inquiry into social facts. 
Adhering to the scientific method in such studies perhaps 
provides only a limited, and not entirely satisfying, check on 
the interference of researchers’ biases. But, however imperfect 
the process might be, the benefits of a scientific social inquiry 
are worth the effort. 
B.  Amalgamation of Facts and Norms in Constitutional 
Doctrine 
In addition to the complicating reality that research on 
social facts can be imbued with value preferences, courts and 
scholars regularly conflate facts and values in constitutional 
discourse. This is so in respect to both the language of the 
Constitution itself and the rules and standards that give the 
Constitution effect. The Constitution, for example, guarantees 
the people the right to peaceably assemble and to be secure 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. But what conduct 
passes as peaceable and what actions are unreasonable are not 
specified, though assemblages and searches and seizures are 
easily enough imagined empirically. In applying the 
necessarily imprecise words of the Constitution, the Court also 
regularly fashions tests that are composites of fact and value. 
The Constitution, for instance, limits congressional power to 
regulate commerce to “interstate commerce.” In one application 
of this doctrine, the Court asks whether the subject of 
regulation “substantially affects interstate commerce.” When 
the substantiality threshold has been crossed is a value 
judgment that, surprisingly, has garnered little serious 
scholarly attention. 
In constitutional cases, therefore, the line dividing law 
and fact is not a bright one. Indeed, it is so dim that courts and 
commentators regularly fail to notice it. As a consequence, 
normative and empirical arguments in constitutional litigation 
tend to meld into one another and clarity is the primary victim. 
For instance, Casey’s undue burden standard, mentioned 
above, is explicitly contemplated as an empirically conscious 
test of the constitutionality of pre-viability abortion regula-
tions. Yet in neither the case itself nor in subsequent case law 
has the Court adequately defined the normative component 
represented by the term “undue” or the empirical component 
represented by the term “burden.” Instead, the undue burden 
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standard, in practice, is ill-defined both normatively and 
empirically.76 
In constitutional litigation, as is the case in most 
litigation, the division of responsibility between judge and trier 
of fact (jury or judge) is allocated on the basis of the nature of 
the issue presented. Matters of pure law are the exclusive 
responsibility of judges and matters of pure fact are resolved by 
triers of fact. The third category, and the one in which most 
constitutional facts fall, are mixed questions of fact and law. In 
ordinary litigation, these categories tend to define the line 
between judge and jury. In constitutional cases, in contrast, 
judges often—albeit not always—act in the dual capacity of 
determiner of law and finder of fact. Nonetheless, for a variety 
of reasons, the categories of pure law, pure fact, and mixed 
questions of fact and law, are an important component of 
constitutional adjudication. 
Questions of pure law involve the interpretation of the 
Constitution and the setting forth of doctrine. In practice, 
purely legal questions thus concern the definition of the rules 
and standards that are applied in constitutional adjudication. 
Examples range from whether “fighting words” sometimes 
qualify as “speech” within the First Amendment77 to whether 
congressional actions must “affect” or “substantially affect” 
interstate commerce.78 In the Casey example from above, it was 
a purely legal question whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
protection of reproductive liberty should be implemented 
pursuant to the “undue burden” standard or the more 
traditional strict scrutiny test. This issue is reserved 
exclusively for judges to decide. This category of purely legal 
questions, therefore, encompasses all matters of doctrinal 
definition. It is under this doctrinal edifice that pure facts and 
mixed questions of fact and law are ultimately decided. 
In non-constitutional cases, “case-specific facts” (also 
known as “pure facts” or “historical facts”)79 fuel the engine of 
  
 76 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 
530 U.S. 914 (2000).  
 77 Compare R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1992) (finding 
that “content-based” regulation of fighting words violated the First Amendment), with 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (holding that prohibition 
against “classical fighting words” fell outside the bounds of constitutional protection).  
 78 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (criticizing earlier 
Commerce Clause cases for failing to impose substantiality requirement to applicable 
test). 
 79 If forced to choose between these two terms, I prefer “pure facts,” though 
like the term “truth,” it promises more than it can possibly deliver. In constitutional 
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litigation. Such facts play a more modest role in constitutional 
cases. Indeed, although case-specific facts occur throughout 
constitutional law, they typically must be digested by 
applicable doctrine and come to be treated as mixed questions 
of fact and law. For example, in Scott v. Harris, the plaintiff-
motorist claimed that the defendant police officer acted 
unreasonably and violated his Fourth Amendment rights when 
the officer forced the motorist off the road during a high-speed 
chase.80 As the Court explained, the circumstances of the car 
chase raised factual issues that had to be resolved in light of 
the evidence available and pursuant to ordinary rules of 
procedure.81 Once these case-specific facts were determined, the 
question whether the officer acted in an objectively reasonable 
fashion became a legal question. The process of evaluating the 
facts against the applicable legal standard is designated as a 
mixed question of law and fact. According to the Court, “[i]n 
determining the reasonableness of the manner in which a 
seizure is effected, ‘[w]e must balance the nature and quality of 
the intrusion in the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to 
justify the intrusion.’”82 
As a practical matter, therefore, although case-specific 
facts can be readily identified in constitutional cases, they 
virtually always must be evaluated under some constitutional 
rule of decision. Whether this or that fact is constitutionally 
protected or unprotected is a legal question. In Scott, for 
instance, the plaintiff-motorist argued that the constitution-
ality of the officer’s action in forcing him off the road during a 
high-speed car chase should have been controlled by the 
outcome in Tennessee v. Garner.83 In Garner, the Court found 
that an officer had used excessive force when he shot a fleeing 
unarmed burglary suspect in the back of the head.84 The 
constitutional issue presented in Scott and Garner was the 
  
cases, the term “historical facts” is confusing, since judges often look to history (i.e., 
original intent) to answer questions of pure law and mixed questions of law and fact. I 
use the term “case-specific facts” to avoid this confusion. Case-specific facts refer to the 
who, why, where, what, and how of some event or occurrence having constitutional 
import. 
 80 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1773 (2007). 
 81 In Scott, the plaintiff had lost at summary judgment, so the relevant facts 
had to be determined with “all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent 
supportable by the record.” Id. at 1776 (emphasis omitted). 
 82 Id. at 1778 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). 
 83 Id. at 1777; see generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 84 Garner, 471 U.S. at 21. 
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same. Given the facts presented,85 did the police act in an 
objectively reasonable way? The Scott Court concluded, 
however, that the same rule-of-decision dictated different 
outcomes. The Court stated that “the threat posed by the flight 
on foot of an unarmed suspect [was not] even remotely 
comparable to the extreme danger to human life posed by [the 
fleeing motorist] in this case.”86 
As Scott illustrates, ordinary case-specific facts can be 
incorporated into constitutional lawmaking through the 
decisional rules established pursuant to the Constitution. 
Hence, the plain facts of the car chase were evaluated under 
the normative reasonableness standard contained in the 
Fourth Amendment. But constitutional facts are rarely as plain 
or unambiguous as Scott’s car chase, which was captured on 
video. Indeed, most facts having constitutional relevance are 
not simple case-specific facts, like Scott’s car chase, but instead 
are complex scientific or general historical facts, like viability 
or the intentions of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment 
or the effects of violent television on young viewers. 
Although they might be the subject of numerous and 
intricate scientific studies, facts such as “viability” or the 
“effects of violent television” can still be identified separately 
and then integrated into constitutional lawmaking.87 Consider, 
as a case study, the complex empirical issues surrounding 
physician-assisted suicide that were presented in Washington 
v. Glucksberg.88 The plaintiffs in Glucksberg claimed that a 
person who is terminally ill and mentally competent should 
have the right to choose what form his or her death would take, 
and have the right to a physician’s assistance in exercising that 
right.89 The plaintiffs claimed that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause extended to “the liberty to choose 
  
 85 The division of the issue into “pure facts” and the legal resolution of those 
facts raises the question of the respective responsibilities between trier of fact and 
judge as a practical matter. Space precludes consideration of this issue in the essay. 
 86 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1777. 
 87 The complexities surrounding historical facts, such as the original 
intentions of the drafters of the Second Amendment, are beyond the scope of this essay. 
As a general matter, however, the methods of historical exploration are sufficiently 
similar to the methods many social scientists use in that most of the lessons drawn 
here regarding science and scientists should apply to history and historians as well. 
See HAACK, supra note 5, at 24 (comparing the methods of science to “what historians 
or detectives or investigative journalists or the rest of us do when we really want to 
find something out”). 
 88 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 89 Id. at 722. 
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how to die,” or “the right to choose a humane, dignified 
death.”90 The Court, however, with Chief Justice Rehnquist 
writing, defined the asserted right as the “right to commit 
suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”91  
It is, of course, a basic principle of hornbook law  
that the existence or non-existence of a fundamental right 
ordinarily dictates the level of judicial review that is accorded a 
disputed state action. Hence, if the plaintiffs’ view prevailed, so 
that the right to physician-assisted death was deemed a 
fundamental right, the state would be obligated to justify 
infringements or limitations of the exercise of that right by 
demonstrating that its action was narrowly tailored to advance 
a compelling government interest. If the right was deemed  
a liberty interest but not fundamental, the state’s burden 
would be substantially lighter, and would require only that  
the action was rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest. The Court had little difficulty in finding that the 
right, given its definition as the right to commit suicide, was 
not fundamental. “[F]or over 700 years,” Rehnquist explained, 
“the Anglo-American common law tradition has punished or 
otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.”92 
Under the Court’s interpretation, therefore, the state did not 
have to advance and prove a strong justification for its prohi-
bition of assisted suicide. But the legal posture of Glucksberg 
turns out to be more complicated, as the concurring opinions of 
Justices Stevens and Souter make clear. 
Justice Stevens wrote separately to emphasize that the 
Court’s holding did not preclude later protection of a terminally 
ill patient’s right to assistance in hastening death. The Court, 
he stated, merely found that the Washington statute prohibit-
ing suicide was not invalid “on its face.”93 The Court’s decision 
“does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of  
the statute might well be invalid.”94 In particular, Stevens 
contemplated a case in which a mentally competent person  
who is terminally ill and suffering excruciating pain seeks a 
physician’s help to facilitate the end. “The liberty interest at 
stake in a case like this,” Stevens said, “is an interest in 
  
 90 Id. at 703. 
 91 Id. at 723. 
 92 Id. at 711. 
 93 Id. at 739 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 94 Id. 
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deciding how, rather than whether, a critical threshold shall  
be crossed.”95 
Justice Souter also wrote separately to point out that 
Glucksberg sits atop a constitutional fault-line that might shift 
as our understanding of the empirical landscape changes. 
Souter sought to reconcile Rehnquist’s majority opinion finding 
no right to assisted suicide and Stevens’s presaging the next 
case down the line, which presents the sympathetic situation of 
the competent terminally ill patient in debilitating pain who 
wants to choose a dignified end to a dignified life. Souter wrote 
that the core concern in these cases was fact-based. 
Souter asserted that the state has no interest in denying 
a competent terminally ill patient in debilitating pain his or 
her choice of how to die. According to Souter, the state’s 
legitimate interest lies in averting mistakes, in precluding 
assisted suicide from becoming directed suicide. The state thus 
rationally fears the slippery slope that once a procedure is set 
in place that permits some to freely choose death, others will be 
encouraged or even forced into this choice. “The nub of this part 
of the State’s argument is not that such patients are 
constitutionally undeserving of relief on their own account, but 
that any attempt to confine a right of physician assistance to 
the circumstances presented by these doctors is likely to fail.”96  
Whether the state is correct that compassionate 
assistance in dying ineluctably leads to involuntary euthanasia 
is an empirical question. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist cited and discussed at length a study from the 
Netherlands designed to test this hypothesis. According to 
Rehnquist, the 1990 Dutch study reported “2,300 cases of 
voluntary euthanasia (defined as ‘the deliberate termination of 
another’s life at his request’), 400 cases of assisted suicide, and 
more than 1,000 cases of euthanasia without an explicit 
request.”97 More profoundly disturbing, Rehnquist reported 
that, in addition to those 1,000 cases, “the study found an 
additional 4,941 cases where physicians administered lethal 
morphine overdoses without the patients’ explicit consent.”98 
Rehnquist concluded that the Dutch study  
  
 95 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 745. 
 96 Id. at 754 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 97 Id. at 734 (majority opinion). 
 98 Id. 
2008] SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1097 
 
suggests that, despite the existence of various reporting procedures, 
euthanasia in the Netherlands has not been limited to competent, 
terminally ill adults who are enduring physical suffering, and that 
regulation of the practice may not have prevented abuses in cases 
involving vulnerable persons, including severely disabled neonates 
and elderly persons suffering from dementia.99  
Justice Souter, however, found the empirical record 
more mixed. On the one hand, some commentators found that 
Dutch guidelines have “proved signally ineffectual; non-
voluntary euthanasia is now widely practised and increasingly 
condoned in the Netherlands.”100 On the other hand, some 
researchers have found the opposite, that “Dutch physicians 
are not euthanasia enthusiasts and they are slow to practice it 
in individual cases.”101 Souter concluded that he could not say 
with any “assurance which side is right.”102 
Ordinarily, when the fact of the matter is uncertain, 
procedural burdens of proof allocate the risks of error and 
guide decision making. Standards of proof should be based on 
underlying normative considerations associated with the costs 
of making a mistake. This is why the burden of proof in civil 
cases is the preponderance standard, but is beyond a 
reasonable doubt in criminal cases. In constitutional cases, 
such allocation ought to depend on the constitutional values 
found to be implicit in the text. In Glucksberg, this issue 
depended on the Court’s interpretation of the due process 
clause. The main area of focus, as set forth in the Stevens and 
Souter opinions, was whether the due process clause might 
extend protection to a competent, terminally ill patient, who 
was in debilitating pain. According to Stevens, “[a]voiding 
intolerable pain and the indignity of living one’s final days 
incapacitated and in agony is certainly ‘at the heart of [the] 
liberty . . . to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and the mystery of human life.’”103 If Stevens’s 
position is correct, then the state should have the burden to 
demonstrate that procedural protections cannot be enacted to 
  
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing and quoting John Keown, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the 
Slippery Slope?, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 261, 289 (John Keown ed., 1995)). 
 101 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing and quoting RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? 322 (1997)). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 745 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (citing 
and quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
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avoid involuntary euthanasia if it seeks to entirely proscribe 
assisted suicide for the terminally ill, competent patient 
suffering intolerable pain. Accordingly, the Constitution would 
guarantee the right of physician-assisted suicide in a select 
group of cases until states adequately demonstrated that 
procedural mechanisms were unavailable to avoid the slide into 
involuntary euthanasia. 
Oddly, Justice Souter failed to follow this basic logic 
when he reached the issue of how the empirical question might 
be resolved in future cases. According to him, the Court’s 
decision regarding whether the right to die is constitutionally 
based should await state experimentation to determine 
whether there is a workable stopping point between assisted 
suicide and involuntary euthanasia. He stated that the Court 
should “stay its hand” until the state legislatures had ample 
opportunity to study the question. But Souter essentially put 
the horse behind the cart. The existence of a constitutional 
right to assisted suicide should not depend on whether 
procedural protections can be constructed to avoid having the 
right to die turn into the duty to die. This factual issue, the 
subject of the Dutch research and Souter’s hoped-for subject of 
future American research, concerns the government’s interest 
in curtailing the claimed right to die. The fundamental right to 
autonomy over death, if it exists, exists separately from the 
state’s claimed reasons for regulating or prohibiting it.104 
By analogy, states have often sought to regulate violent 
pornography on the basis that it makes consumers of it more 
prone to be violent.105 Violent pornography falls within the 
protection of the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. 
This means that violent pornography cannot be prohibited 
until the state demonstrates empirically that it causes violence. 
Thus, the right is protected first, and government claims of 
compelling reasons to permit regulation of it must be proved—a 
demand that might take considerable time and effort on the 
  
 104 This practice of using a state’s asserted justification for infringing a right 
as a basis for finding that no right exists in the first instance is not unique to Justice 
Souter. It can be found throughout the Court’s cases. See Lawrence H. Tribe and 
Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1057, 1096-97 (1990). Its frequency, however, does not render it legitimate. See David 
L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests: Madisonian 
Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1539 (1992). 
 105 See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 
1985) (invalidating Indiana’s anti-pornography statute, which, among other things, 
proscribed violent pornography). 
2008] SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1099 
 
part of legislatures. Contrary to Souter’s argument, this has 
not interfered with public officials studying the issue of the 
effects of violent pornography and, indeed, this topic has been 
the subject of substantial research attention as well as two 
presidential commissions.106 In fact, placing the burden on 
legislatures is likely to produce more research, not less, since 
states need to generate evidence to justify their legislation. 
Hence, the free speech right exists and continues to be 
protected until legislatures develop sufficient proof to 
demonstrate a compelling interest to justify infringements of 
that right. There is no reason why exactly the same sort of 
analysis should not apply to assisted dying. 
Recognizing that the Constitution evolves as society—
and, more particularly, our factual understanding of society—
changes does not make the Constitution any less “durable” 
than Souter’s institutional deference to legislatures in 
Glucksberg would make it. In his universe, the Constitution 
“changes” if the legislative answer is that procedural pro-
tections can be instituted to ensure that assisted dying does  
not become forced euthanasia. At that point in time, the 
Glucksberg ruling would have to be “amended” to permit the 
right to die so long as it is accompanied by whatever procedural 
protections the states come up with to prevent involuntary 
euthanasia. In the alternative, the Constitution “changes” if 
assisted dying is protected today, but legislatures demonstrate 
tomorrow that procedural controls are ineffective. States would 
have demonstrated that they have a compelling interest in 
prohibiting all assisted suicides, because the practice cannot be 
limited to the small group in which it is appropriate. The only 
question is what is to be the default position. In the absence of 
sound empirical research one way or the other, does assisted 
suicide receive constitutional protection or does it not? The 
empirical question of the availability of procedural controls 
adequate to avoid involuntary euthanasia must be evaluated in 
light of the answer to this question. This is a matter of 
constitutional interpretation. Science cannot say what the 
Constitution means, but it can provide a window into the world 
so that constitutional values can be justly applied. Science thus 
informs the constitutional analysis. 
  
 106 See generally ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL 
REPORT (1986); THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 
(1970). 
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In the example of physician-assisted suicide, science 
should play a pivotal role in deciding actual cases. But it does 
not displace classic constitutional value definition. Indeed, it 
should clarify it. This issue presents an archetypal clash of 
irreconcilable principles. On the one hand, the state declares 
an abiding and weighty interest in protecting life, including 
especially the weak and vulnerable who might be hastened 
toward death in a general scheme permitting assisted suicide. 
On the other hand, due process guarantees individuals the 
liberty to make decisions regarding core attributes of their 
lives, which, under certain circumstances, includes how their 
lives end. Although the weight of the state’s interest in life or 
the magnitude of the costs associated with an individual’s loss 
of liberty if forced to endure his or her final days in intolerable 
pain are normative judgments, the empirical realities endemic 
to this clash of principles are readily determinable. A fair and 
just determination of constitutional cases cannot be achieved 
without a sound and accurate understanding of the world to 
which those decisions apply.  
When facts are relevant under particular constitutional 
rules or standards, courts should strive to define and under-
stand them separate from the constitutional norms that apply. 
If a regulation operates as an obstacle to the exercise of a 
woman’s constitutionally protected right to a pre-viability 
abortion, for instance, that fact can be independently 
determined. Once it is determined—albeit with all of the 
limitations and caveats associated with doing this research—
courts can separately resolve whether the obstacle is 
“substantial” or the burden it puts on the right is “undue.” 
Similarly, the factual question of whether physician-assisted 
suicide increases the incidence of involuntary euthanasia is a 
component of, but independent from, the constitutional norm of 
whether physician-assisted suicide is a protected fundamental 
right. Even the most fundamental of rights, such as political 
speech, can be regulated if the government’s interests are 
sufficiently compelling. Good research on physician-assisted 
suicide should demonstrate whether the dangers of this 
practice provide a compelling justification for prohibiting it. By 
keeping constitutional value-definition separate from consti-
tutional fact-finding, the analytical bases for constitutional 
outcomes will be clearer and thereby more legitimate. 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
The question whether a world exists independent of our 
minds’ perception of it would probably appear quite absurd to 
the average lawyer or judge. The justices of the Supreme Court 
would undoubtedly be amazed to be asked such a question. 
They almost certainly subscribe to basic realist tenets, at least 
in the belief that the world is mind-independent. The justices 
would probably also share the realists’ belief that while 
researchers’ values sometimes affect the conclusions they draw 
about the mechanics of the “real world,” the methods of science 
are well designed to limit or reveal those biases. 
Yet, despite its likely realist orientation, the Court 
repeatedly treats facts in constitutional cases in anti-realist 
ways. In particular, the Court describes the factual world 
constructively, so that the facts serve normative or interpretive 
ends. The Court appears largely unconcerned with the actual 
reality of the factual premises it relies upon. Anti-realists may 
believe that this is an inevitable consequence of the task the 
Court faces in integrating highly complex empirical informa-
tion into the intricacies of constitutional doctrine. In this essay, 
I argue that it is possible for the Court to employ a scienti-
fically realist constitutional jurisprudence. In so concluding, I 
consider two principal challenges to a realist approach in 
constitutional cases. First, I reject the argument that the sorts 
of facts the Constitution makes relevant—primarily social and 
behavioral facts studied by social scientists—cannot be studied 
objectively. Second, I describe how constitutional tests that 
appear to be conglomerations of facts and values can be 
separated into their component parts. While these challenges 
are formidable, they are not insurmountable. 
Constitutional rulings should be defined by the real 
world because they define the real world. The Constitution is 
an eminently practical document. Although cast for immor-
tality, it is grounded in modern times and must attend to 
contemporary circumstances. As John Marshall put it, the 
Constitution was “intended to endure for ages to come, and, 
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human 
affairs.”107 A constitution that is interpreted in disregard of a 
sound understanding of empirical realities is exceedingly 
unlikely to endure.  
  
 107 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis in 
original).  
